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INTRODUCTION
What would a religious film look and feel like in a post-religious world?  1 This is the question 
guiding the argument of this paper. Such a film would need to offer its audience a religious 
experience not as the defining feature of this world, but as an “otherwise” possibility. Is such 
an experience possible in today’s cinema? Can the cinematic “apparatus”2 — the figurations, 
gestures, technical codes and modes of address whereby film announces itself as film — offer 
its audience an experience equivalent to the kind of experience offered by religion itself? 
Adrian Martin has identified the need to address the sacred in film from a non-religious 
perspective in the following way: “the problem, or challenge, for non-believers [is] to under-
stand and use a language of the sacred or the spiritual but without religion; to approach and 
celebrate mystery — especially poetic mystery […] but without the mystical.”3 In responding 
to Martin’s challenge to approach the “poetic mystery” of film and to “understand and use a 
language of the sacred or the spiritual but without religion,” my task will be to develop a cri-
tique of film using concepts drawn from German Idealist philosophy and more recent film 
philosophy and theory, setting out a way of thinking about religious experience in non-
religious terms as it might apply to film. 
More specifically, I will employ Friedrich Schleiermacher’s concept of religious experi-
ence as a feeling of the infinite released from systems of belief. In Schleiermacher’s terms, 
religious experience is an excess over belief, opening into a “beyond” without measure.4 My 
paper will examine how this “beyond,” as an excess over belief, has been captured and 
framed within the apparatus of Hollywood film melodrama as an ameliorative experience, 
moving from injustice towards justice, guided by divine providence. Through a reading of 
Mervyn LeRoy’s Blossoms in the Dust (1941), I will show how the task of melodrama is to 
unblock the protagonist’s blocked situation, releasing her for the moral good. Hollywood 
CINEMA 4 ! 133
film melodrama subjectifies audience’s belief in the moral good within the mythic presenta-
tion of a world defined by ideals of historical progress linked to the power of industrialised 
capitalism. In such a world, elected individuals (protagonists) are provided with the means 
of effecting their own salvation through the auspices of a divinely decreed nation-state 
promising individual freedom. Their salvation becomes the salvation of all, embodied in 
those audiences subject to the apparatus of cinematic melodrama and its capacity to deliver 
an experience of the moral good through the pleasure of film. I will then show how Terrence 
Malick’s film The Tree of Life (2011) counters melodramatic amelioration and the subjectifica-
tion of its audience to the cinematic apparatus by breaching its own framework, opening to 
a beyond carried by the film itself in its own material becoming. My aim is to show that The 
Tree of Life restores faith in film to carry Being — the measureless-infinite of finite life. The 
Tree of Life breaks with the closure of melodrama and opens to the poetic mystery of film it-
self.
I. RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND FILM
SCHLEIERMACHER AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
In his essays entitled On Religion: Speeches to its Cultural Despisers, the nineteenth century 
German theologian and philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher provides a critique of religion 
that rejects the reduction of religious feeling to autonomous subjective states as defined by 
the Kantian system of reason.5 Schleiermacher’s essays, written early in his career under the 
influence of the Frühromantik philosophers, were well regarded in their day, and, along with 
other writings of the Frühromantik movement, call for a shift in emphasis away from inner 
aesthetic states and towards an experience of openness as an excess of feeling inhabiting ra-
tional systems of thought and meaning production.6 Schleiermacher’s aim is no less than a 
complete reformation of religion, away from dogmatic rationalism and toward singular feel-
ings of openness to the Absolute7  which he understands as “a sense and taste for the 
Infinite.”8 This sense of the infinite is “the unity of intuition and feeling which is immedi-
ate”;9 a sense of the infinite felt in the contingency of finite life.10 
Schleiermacher’s critique of religion is important for today’s post-religious world be-
cause it characterises religion as an experience defined in non-religious terms. It does this by 
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drawing from critical philosophy responding to Kant’s critique of reason. Critical responses 
to Kant by Schleiermacher and other post-Kantian thinkers of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries should not be seen as outdated historical arguments; rather, they begin 
the project of critical modernism that still claims our thinking today, posing fundamental 
questions about subjectivity and the transcendence of reason — questions we have yet to 
surpass. The guiding thread of this paper is as follows: how might Schleiermacher’s concept 
of religious experience as an excess of feeling inhabiting systems of reason be applied to 
post-religious film; that is, how might this concept of excess — an excess that threatens to 
destroy systems of belief — be applied to film with a religious “structure of feeling” 11  of-
fered to its audience in a post-religious world. 
Raymond Williams defines a structure of feeling as “elements of impulse, restraint and 
tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against 
thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, 
in a living and interrelating continuity.”12 A structure of feeling “cannot without loss be re-
duced to belief-systems, institutions, or explicit general relationships, though it may include 
all these as lived and experienced.”13 Rather, a structure of feeling exceeds belief-systems in 
the “generative immediacy”14 of finite situations, opening into absolute possibility, or possi-
bility without measure.15 Evidence of a structure of feeling can be found in “semantic figures 
— which in art and literature, are often the very first indication that such a new structure is 
forming”.16 In their generative immediacy, film texts are capable of offering a newly forming 
structure of feeling irreducible to the audience’s subjectified belief in the systems of meaning 
that allow them to make sense of their already formed world. By the term “structure of feel-
ing,” Williams does not mean the feeling already instituted and normalised by the appara-
tuses of subjectification, but the feeling experienced in art and literature as the prefiguring of 
otherness; as the possibility of being beyond current modes of subjectification. 
I will be concerned with the structure of feeling produced as an excess in the system of 
Hollywood film, which I will define in terms of melodrama: a systematic formalisation of 
feeling in which “fallen” human being is restored to the wholeness of feeling and meaning 
through an ameliorative process of retributive justice.17 Melodrama captures the excess of 
feeling that inhabits the systems of meaning of everyday life and guides it back into the 
cinematic apparatus as that which needs to be overcome and transformed in the amelioration 
of human existence. My aim is to show how a post-religious film, in particular Terrence Ma-
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lick’s The Tree of Life, refuses the ameliorative solution to the reparation of fallen human exis-
tence offered by film melodrama, thereby opening up an “otherwise” possibility — a possi-
bility that equates with Schleiermacher’s idea of religious experience as openness to the Ab-
solute — in the “event” of the film itself.
In the first and second speeches of On Religion, Schleiermacher sets out the conditions 
under which religious experience can be postulated in critique. He defines religion as an ac-
tivity; as something that happens in a primary sense of forces cancelling each other out: “re-
ligion, then, is a mixture of elements that oppose and neutralise each other.”18 Religious ex-
perience is, like the experience of art, a stasis of contradictory forces — the cosmic forces of 
expansion and contraction — held together in the fact that singular things simply are. The 
critical issue for Schleiermacher is how singular things can be while still being part of the 
forces of expansion and contraction at the same time, as “the two original tendencies of spiri-
tual nature.”19 Like Schelling’s Naturphilosophie20 published around the same time, Schleier-
macher’s critique of religion attempts to think its object (religious experience) from primary 
activity, as the grounding and ungrounding of the forces of nature.
The activity that Schleiermacher ascribes to religious experience can be understood as 
pre-subjective and concerned with Being — the possibility that something can be. Possibility 
implies “being possible” irreducible to what the thing is. If things were nothing more than 
the being they already are, then they could not be otherwise, and hence all would be the 
same. To account for diverse modes of being, there must be Being irreducible to the being 
that things are. Being defines the being of things in their possibility as such. In his “Letter 
on ‘Humanism,’” Martin Heidegger defines this kind of possibility as enabling possibility, 
to distinguish it from the possibility of calculative rationality.21 Otherness does not tran-
scend beings, but is enabled in the “event of Being” itself. I will argue that film enables pos-
sibility in its poetic-technical turning-unfolding – as a carrying of the event of Being. From 
this critical, post-religious perspective, the otherness inhabiting film poses questions of 
onto-theology: Being as equivalent to God. Otherness is not located in a transcendent or di-
vine order, but in the enabling-being of the film itself; in its “generative immediacy”22 as a 
meaningful event. Film opens itself to Being in the otherness that it makes possible as a fi-
nite event experienced by the viewer herself. A religious experience in this post-religious 
sense is an experience of Being as otherness felt in the event of film — in its poetic unfold-
ing as film.
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For Schleiermacher, religious experience is the feeling of openness to the Absolute as an 
experience of the Whole of what is. This sense of wholeness is not something that is simply 
there for anyone to experience; rather, it must be gained from contradictory “impulses” in 
humans, to become either self-enclosed in subjective states or given over to pious feelings of 
the Infinite.23 Schleiermacher suggests that this experience of wholeness can only come to 
those able to hold onto the opposing impulses, as a contradictory sense of the infinite in the 
finite “work[ing] in them as a creative power.”24 This contradictory sense of the whole as 
infinite/finite impulse opens the experience to “the eternal and Holy Being that lives beyond 
the world.”25 This “beyond” is not a transcendent or divine order in another world removed 
from the contingency of human existence, but a virtual space of otherness immanent to the 
historical time and place of singular human existence in this world. Someone inhabiting such 
an experience of the beyond feels a sense of all possibilities held for a moment in the opening 
event, where “all combinations [of being] are actually present in humanity.”26 In a move that 
prefigures Heidegger’s concept of Ereignis,27 Schleiermacher’s proposal of religious feeling as 
an activity inhabiting systems of reason opens critique to the possibility of an otherwise 
movement affirming itself within the closure of the subject in technical formats and aesthetic 
states. This otherwise movement in the post-religious film is the experience of openness into 
absolute possibility enacted by the film itself. The film turns against itself in opening otherwise. 
My aim in what follows is to pursue this line of thought in terms of the poetic-technical event 
of film.
BAZIN AND CINEMATIC BELIEF
Recently, film theorists have turned to the writings of André Bazin to address the issue of 
belief in cinema, in both a theological and ontological sense.28 Bazin’s arguments are espe-
cially interesting in this regard because they promise a revelatory cinema — a cinema that 
reveals the beyond of absolute possibility — carried by the technology of film itself. Rather 
than identifying religious experience in terms of the content of film (its stories and charac-
ters), Bazin proposes an “ontology” of the film image — its mode of being — based on an 
underlying photographic realism: 
The photographic image is the object itself, freed from the conditions of time and space 
that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discoloured, no matter how lacking in 
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documentary value the image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its be-
coming, the being of the model of which it is a reproduction; it is the model.29 
The photographic image is not a degraded form of reality, but an event of being-with its ob-
ject. The technology of photographic reproduction (“the very process of its becoming”) 
means that the image produced shares the same being as that of its object (“it is the model”). 
From this ontological realist position, Bazin argues that the photographic image becomes an 
automaton independent of human intervention:
Originality in photography as distinct from originality in painting lies in the essentially 
objective character of photography. […] For the first time, between the originating object 
and its reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a nonliving agent. For 
the first time an image of the world is formed automatically.30 
Because of its status as an automaton (an “automatic” production), the photographic-
cinematic image reveals the world “objectively,” as a revelation of the mystery of Being. 
We can see how Bazin employs ontological realism as a revelation of the mystery of Be-
ing by turning to one of his film reviews. In his review of Augusto Geninas’s Heaven Over the 
Marshes (Cielo sulla palude, 1949),31 Bazin writes that the film presents a “truly religious expe-
rience,” not as hagiography or special effects, but through the realism of the images them-
selves: their fidelity to life. In the presentation of its subject matter — the rape and murder of 
a peasant girl later canonised for her forgiveness of the crime — the film suggests the pres-
ence of divine grace “through some ambiguous signs that can all be explained in quite natu-
ral terms.” The film presents “an ambiguous manifestation of a spiritual reality that is im-
possible to prove,” achieved through “the dictates of realism.” Through its realist images, the 
film expresses divine grace; that is, the film becomes the divine reality made apparent in real-
ist images appearing on the screen.
This type of argument has been subject to much criticism for its assumption of an un-
mediated relation between the photographic-cinematic image and the object represented by 
it (the objectivist fallacy). It is for this reason that Bazin’s work has fallen out of favour over 
the past few decades. However, in seeking a transcendent-realist theory of film, scholars 
have recently turned to Bazin but with a new inflection. For instance, Robert Sinnerbrink 
CINEMA 4 · MULES! 138
proposes that we understand Bazin’s ontological realism in terms of “cinematic belief” or 
“the conviction that [the film image] bears the trace of a former presence.”32 Sinnerbrink 
suggests that there is a certain psychological dimension to Bazin’s argument, in effect shift-
ing ground from an ontology of the photographic-cinematic image to an aesthetics of belief 
in the reality of “unique cinematic worlds.”33 These worlds are “liberated from the flow of 
time,”34 enabling us to overcome our “fear of death”35 and “reveal reality anew.”36 Cine-
matic belief revives “that sensuous love of the world, a belief in its reality, that we have for-
gotten or lost.”37  
But has belief in the reality of unique cinematic worlds really been lost?  Is such belief 
not simply the way audiences already relate to the cinema?  Through its phantasmic-plastic 
power to present fictional worlds steeped in realist myths, cinema has always presented 
unique cinematic worlds soliciting audience belief. Film, especially Hollywood feature film, 
already reproduces “reality anew” in scenarios that invite the audience to overcome the 
fear of death through stories of struggle against adversity. Film already renews a quasi-
religious “sensuous love of the world” in the mythic enactment of human life as meaning-
fully idealised. Thus, audiences have already come to believe in a cinematic realism that 
presents a world “liberated from the flow of time,” as a way of being intimately connected 
with their lives. Cinematic belief in the reality of this world has not been “forgotten or lost,” 
as Sinnerbrink suggests, but is constantly renewed in the mythic enactment of the triumph 
of the human spirit over adversity, self-doubt, and the forces of otherness presented 
through the ameliorative film melodrama ruling popular cinema and culture over the last 
century.38 
A specifically renewed belief in the world through an experience of absolute openness 
in film cannot be a belief in the reality of unique cinema worlds, as these worlds are already 
subject to quasi-religious belief in cinematic realism expressed in the structure of feeling en-
closed by melodrama. So what would such a belief be?  Recalling Schleiermacher’s sense of 
an immanent beyond in the contingency of finite life, I argue that such a belief would need 
to be a belief in the “beyond” of cinema worlds currently produced. This is not a belief in a 
cinematic beyond (a world constituted by yet more cinema), but a belief in the possibility of 
a “beyond cinema” — a beyond in the possibility of a non-cinema real. Such a belief would 
first require faith that another world could be; faith in the “nothing” of the cinematic world 
itself. 
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FAITH IN NOTHING
In his book The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology, Simon Critchley dis-
cusses Pauline theology in terms of faith in “nothing.” He writes: 
Paul is preaching a meontology, an account of things that are not. Furthermore, his is a 
double meontology: on the one hand, the form of this world is passing away or fal-
ling away and becoming nothing. This is the nihilism of world politics. But, on the 
other hand, what will take the place of the “god of this world” is at present nothing. 
It is simply the anguished vigilance of the Messianic standpoint defined by its rela-
tion to the futurity of parousia [the imminent Second Coming as presence of God]. […] 
Paul is announcing something that […] breaks with the order of being in the name of 
an event which is not. The event is something indiscernible in the situation.39
Faith is faith in the possibility of otherness as the “not” of this current world that “breaks 
with the order of being.” Faith in nothing is a refusal to accept belief in the current system of 
being in order to prepare the way for the being to come. From this Pauline perspective, a 
revelatory cinema would not propose an alternative world of faith in new cinematic worlds 
where faith might be fully expressed, as proposed by the recent turn to Bazinian ontological 
realism, but faith in the nothing that lies beyond the cinematic world as it currently is. To do 
this, film must dismantle current belief in the cinematic world by standing against it. Film 
must stand against itself and open otherwise. Faith is faith in the nothing opening in this ca-
pacity of film to stand against itself, enabling a not-yet-discernable world to begin to appear. 
To demonstrate this point and counter the recent turn to Bazin’s photographic ontological 
realism, I will draw on Roland Barthes’s discussion of photographs in Camera Lucida, as well 
as Jacques Derrida’s analysis of the aporetic logic of the event of bearing witness in Sover-
eignties in Question.
In Camera Lucida, Barthes postulates that the photographic image testifies to the fact that 
“the thing has been there.”40 The viewer’s belief in the reality of the event depicted in the pho-
tograph is based not on any inherent capacity of the technology to make the event real, as is 
the case in Bazin’s ontological realism, but on an ontological gap between the present and the 
past in which the viewer experiences the impossibility of their reparation. The experience of 
viewing photographs is one of disjunctive-chiasmic time in which the presence of the past is 
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felt as something irretrievably lost, yet there nevertheless. In looking at the photograph, I 
bear witness to the event in the “aoristic” sense of reliving the past as if for the first time.41 
For instance, Barthes discusses his viewing of a particular photograph of a street scene in 
Nicaragua during the revolution in the late 1970s which shows a dead body covered in a 
blood splattered sheet:
here on a torn-up pavement, a child’s corpse under a white sheet; parents and friends 
standing around it, desolate: a banal enough scene, unfortunately, but I noted certain 
interferences: the corpse’s one bare foot, the sheet carried by the weeping mother (why 
this sheet?), a woman in the background, probably a friend, holding a handkerchief to 
her nose.42 
Barthes notes “certain interferences” that interrupt the generic conventions of street scenes, 
including an oddly placed boot poking out under the sheet covering the child’s body. These 
singular photographic gestures are not part of the symbolic register of the image — its capac-
ity to convey the “ideal” of the revolution or the brutality of the regime — but the irruption 
of chance in the expectations of my viewing of the photograph. My viewing is interrupted by 
a punctum effect that stops me from reading the image in terms of generic conventions (the 
studium), sending it otherwise.43 These interruptive gestures resist generic convention in af-
firming that this actually happened. They affirm that “this life was” by plunging me into a 
meaningless abyss, where I relive the feeling of death in all its singularity through the mark 
of the gesture itself — its specific resistance to generic convention.
Barthes’s reading of the punctum effect can be understood as a bearing witness to the 
death after the event, as if the viewer were reliving the event for the first time. In Derrida’s 
terms, this “as if” is a carrying of the “truth” of the event: its singular happening as a truth 
that has to be believed.44 If life is to go on, then one simply has to believe, despite the impos-
sibility of the restoration of the event to full presence. Derrida calls this “having to believe” a 
“performative-pragmatic, [which] is as determining as ‘I believe’.”45 In following this line of 
thinking, cinematic belief must be grounded in an experience of nothingness as “having to 
believe.” This having-to-believe is based on a pragmatic imperative felt in the chiasm be-
tween past and present lives, as a fall into otherness triggered by the event of the film itself. 
From this fallen state, the viewer cannot speculate about the possibility of a “beyond” (she 
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cannot size it up, propose alternatives, come to believe in it) since there is insufficient stabil-
ity of ground from which it could be projected. Rather the viewer simply has to believe, if life 
is to go on. Derrida calls this pragmatic imperative “an appeal to an act of faith.”46 Faith 
comes before belief as its condition of possibility. As Critchley argues in relation to religious 
belief, “What is true, then, is an experience of faith, and this is true for agnostics and atheists 
as it is for theists. Those who cannot believe still require religious truth and the framework of 
ritual in which they can believe.”47 In a post-religious world, we can do without belief, but 
we cannot do without faith without falling into the nothing of nihilistic meaninglessness. 
Following this line of thinking, the task of a revelatory cinema is not to confirm belief, 
but to appeal to an act of faith from its audiences. This act of faith is faith in the “otherness” 
catalysed through a collapse (fall) in the continuum of the cinematic world; a collapse into 
the nothingness of absolute possibility as the mystery of Being. The onto-theological experi-
ence of otherness, as indicated in Schleiermacher’s essays in On Religion, is not to be found in 
belief in the capacity of film to carry the ultimate meaning of the world, but in a crisis of be-
lief in this world through the shattering “interference” (punctum) of a chance event in the ge-
neric order of things, triggering a momentary openness into absolute otherness. This open-
ness is the “nothingness” or the non-being at the heart of being; the absolute possibility of 
being otherwise experienced in the finitude of life as it confronts its limit in death. A cine-
matic faith in nothingness thus requires that film resist its own drive towards the cinematic 
fulfilment of a meaningful world. It must refuse belief in this world in order to open itself 
otherwise, thereby restoring faith in otherness as the very condition of life as freely opened 
possibility. 
II. FATE AND MELODRAMA
In the second part of this paper, I will advance the proposition that Terrence Malick’s film 
The Tree of Life is a post-religious film that opens itself to absolute otherness through a col-
lapse in its own formal structure. This collapse, brought on by specific techniques and cine-
matic gestures, carries the audience into an abyssal beyond which is also the film’s very un-
folding as film. The film’s own “being” — its mode of technical presence — is a “standing 
against” conventional film structure, which I will define in terms of melodrama. By standing 
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against conventional melodrama, the film challenges the audience’s belief in the possibility 
of an ameliorative solution to the fall of human being into injustice and distance from God 
(idealised Being), posing onto-theological questions that call us forth and challenge us “to 
be” through the event of the film itself. 
In order to demonstrate this otherwise mode of being enacted by The Tree of Life, I will 
compare it with Mervyn LeRoy’s 1941 film Blossoms in the Dust. Despite differences in theme, 
period, style and narrative structure, there are compelling reasons to compare the two films. 
Both films are set in provincial Texas towns, and feature a fall of family fortune where the 
main male characters, both entrepreneurial inventors and believers in the American Way, 
lose their standing in the community, ceding power and authority to female principles and 
ideals. Most importantly, both films feature the accidental death of a son, triggering a cathar-
tic “death event” felt through the entirety of each film. Indeed it is difficult not to conclude 
that Malick drew from LeRoy’s film in composing his own epic version of life in provincial 
mid-twentieth century Texas. My aim is to show how the presenting of human being as fated 
for meaningful life in film melodrama, as exemplified in Blossoms in the Dust, is resisted by 
Malick’s film — a resistance that carries its audience into a non-cinematic beyond equivalent 
Schleiermacher’s definition of religious experience. 
THE BLOCKED SITUATION
Melodrama underlies most Hollywood films. It offers a mode of experience to its audiences 
in which human being is fated for a meaningful place in a universe from which God has 
withdrawn. Melodrama attempts to make sense of this universe by substituting its own ver-
sion of fate as a kind of divine providence acting in all things, leading humans towards sal-
vation from their fallen condition in the contingency of life beset by chance and the will to 
power that governs both nature and the social order. Melodrama reshapes these indifferent 
and hostile forces so that they appear to make sense to the audience as an amelioration of 
human being, moving from injustice to justice in a world where a just moral order is gradu-
ally discerned. As Ben Singer argues: “melodrama expressed the anxiety of moral disarray 
and then ameliorated it through utopian moral clarity.”48 Melodrama offers its audience an 
amelioration of human existence thrown into indifference, into a higher moral good as a sub-
stitute for belief in religious solutions to human injustice. Melodrama is thus deeply con-
cerned with the fate of human existence withdrawn from God and subject to the law of 
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chance: “melodrama has persisted as a dramatic mode because, in a fundamental sense, it 
succeeds in expressing ‘the truth of life,’ capturing a crucial existential truth, an aspect of life 
that affects everyone — namely that, ultimately, we are all governed by random forces of 
happenstance. We are all flotsam and jetsam adrift in the ‘tides of chance.’”49 If there is a di-
vine providence at work in melodrama, it is one put there by the mechanics of plot and 
filmic technique to account for and overcome the rule of chance in human existence.
In the nineteenth century stage melodrama from which Hollywood film melodrama 
takes its cue, the fate of human being is presented in quasi-religious terms. Jeffrey Mason 
writes:
the absolute imperative of melodrama is the restoration of the moral, social, and domes-
tic order — and consequently, the reassurance of the audience — by subjecting charac-
ters to a high degree of risk and uncertainty and then lifting them out of danger. [...] 
[T]he melodramatic imperative, operating under the guiding hand of divine providence 
and moving the action toward reconciliation, offers a guarantee that reduces the hero’s 
achievement. By its very nature and method, melodrama must satisfy its audience’s ex-
pectations rather than present a confrontation between belief and value.50 
Stage melodrama restores the audience’s belief in a moral order threatened by nihilism and 
indifference by presenting the “guiding hand of divine providence” as part of the machinery 
of plot. The audience is offered a “reconciliation” of the opposing forces of good and evil, 
where victims of injustice are restored to a just world. In a similar vein, Ben Brewster and Lea 
Jacobs argue that stage melodrama is “motivated by a notion of divine order.”51 Here Brew-
ster and Jacobs are referring to the unlikely plot coincidences of stage melodrama in which 
individuals are either blighted by misfortune or blessed with luck. Lacking a complex mid-
dle ground, stage melodrama swings between good and evil potentials, enacting a presenta-
tion of fate through the transformation of chance into eschatology where the human is re-
stored to justice and the moral good. The nihilistic meaninglessness of the world and the 
subjectification of human being to the indifference of nature is ameliorated through the 
manifestation of what Peter Brooks has termed the “moral occult,” or “the domain of opera-
tive spiritual values which is both indicated within and masked by the surface reality [...] as 
the repository of the fragmentary and desacralized remnants of sacred myth.”52 Melodrama 
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transforms chance into a quasi-religious belief system based on what remains of the sacred 
still operating at an underground level in the post-religious world of western human exis-
tence.
How are these remnants of the sacred carried into film melodrama?  Brewster and Jacobs 
note that “what survives from popular nineteenth century theatre in the 1910s feature [film] 
is “a set of staging practices linked with situational dramaturgy.”53 The “situation” in stage 
melodrama is the presentation of “an unstable constellation of forces precariously held in 
check but nonetheless liable to break out into action.”54 This “static state of affairs”55 or tab-
leau configuration compressed and made manifest the contradictions and tensions requiring 
resolution and action so that “the linear progress of the narrative is arrested or blocked.”56 
The configuration of gestures presented in the tableau situation interrupted narrative flow 
and pointed to what was to come. They “anticipate or sum up a series of cause and effect re-
lationships”57 waiting to be released. The blocking action of the tableau brings the plot into a 
temporary stasis, prefiguring the release of the blocked forces into a resolution in the restora-
tion of justice at the end of the play. For the audience familiar with the conventions of stage 
melodrama, the blockage indicates an injustice demanding to be put right. The logic of 
melodrama is that the righting of injustice does not come from heroic action, but from the 
machinations of the melodramatic plot. As Mason argues, melodrama “reduces the hero’s 
achievement.”58 Although present in melodrama, heroic action is not an expression of indi-
vidual free will, but of divine providence enacted in the resolution of contradictory forces in 
the blocked situation. Thus to understand how the sacred is carried into film melodrama, we 
need to look at how the blocked situation of stage melodrama is transformed into film, from 
a unity of action and gesture presented on the stage to an audiovisual becoming spread 
throughout the film.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN BLOSSOMS IN THE DUST
In this section I will show how classical Hollywood cinema engages its audience through 
the unblocking of a blocked situation. My aim here is to describe the ameliorative move-
ment of melodrama as one based on the elision of time that secures the revelations of plot in 
a transcendent moral order. By showing how this works in Mervyn LeRoy’s Blossoms in the 
Dust (1941), I also describe the limits of melodrama and what it does not allow to be pre-
sented. 
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Mervyn LeRoy’s melodrama Blossoms in the Dust is set in a provincial town in Texas in 
the early twentieth century. It concerns the campaign by Edna Gladney, a real historical per-
son (played by Greer Garson), to have Texas state legislation changed so that children with-
out parents will no longer be designated as illegitimate. The film depicts Edna’s early life as 
a young woman from a wealthy Wisconsin farming family swept off her feet by a handsome 
Texan man, Sam Gladney (Walter Pidgeon), who takes her back to Texas where they marry 
and begin life together, raising a young son and furthering the family’s fortune in the flour 
milling business. 
Blossoms in the Dust begins with two deaths, both of which prefigure the rest of the film. 
The first death occurs with the suicide of Edna’s step sister Charlotte (Edna’s double), whose 
plans to marry into a wealthy family are foiled when her fiancé’s mother refuses to accept 
her because she is discovered to be illegitimate when signing marriage documents. Stricken 
with shame Charlotte locks herself in her room and shoots herself dead. The second death 
occurs a little further into the film. Edna and Sam are happily married with their five year 
old son, Sammy, living in a luxurious mansion in Sherman, Texas. On Christmas eve, Edna 
sends Sammy out to play much against his wishes, but soon after, a servant returns with the 
news that the boy has drowned, presumably in a nearby lake where he had been playing. 
Each death is sudden and dramatic, cutting short young lives and suggesting a malevolent 
force working to undermine the family’s good fortune. But instead of dwelling on the deaths 
and their consequences, the film rushes straight past them as if they had hardly happened. 
For instance, immediately after the scene in which Edna cradles Sammy’s lifeless body in her 
arms, the film shifts abruptly to a sumptuous party where we see Edna, clothed in a fine 
dress and jewels, attending to her role as hostess to the wealthy citizens of Sherman. Al-
though we are told that some years have passed, Edna is presented as if she lacks appropri-
ate concern over her son’s death, suggesting that she has not grieved properly and is in seri-
ous denial.
Through this elision of time, the film provides no opportunity for the audience to see 
how Edna might have dealt with her grief.59 It is as if Edna had blocked her grief by immedi-
ately plunging into a life of excess and self-indulgence. In this way, the film presents us with 
a blocked situation requiring Edna to be released so that she can follow the path set for her, 
which, as we soon find out, is to establish day-care homes for the children of working moth-
ers and eventually to campaign for change in state legislation to take away the stigma of ille-
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gitimacy on abandoned children. The release occurs just as precipitously as Charlotte’s and 
Sammy’s deaths, when Edna is confronted with her denial by the family doctor also attend-
ing the party, and she collapses into her husband’s arms. This scene dissolves into the next 
scene where we now see Sam and Edna no longer living in the luxurious mansion we saw 
previously, but happily inhabiting a neat suburban house full of children. Edna’s self-
indulgent, childless life has been magically transformed into a life of sober industry founded 
on the care for children. These major reversals in Edna’s life happen within the space of a few 
scenes and, in the instance just described, in a single dissolve. The film rushes through 
events, eliding story world elements that would otherwise provide the audience with a suffi-
cient explanation of them. What are we to make of this? 
The task of the melodrama here is not to provide immediate answers to the calamities 
that have befallen the family, but to make the audience bear witness to them. By bearing wit-
ness to them, the audience carries the truth of their injustice as part of the restitution of a just 
moral order. The truth of these calamities cannot be found in causal explanations at the level 
of individual lives, but in the way they contribute to what the film is pointing towards in a 
more general sense — the moral good of the world. Although Charlotte’s and Sammy’s 
deaths appear to be blighted events — the consequence of malevolent forces and indifferent 
chance — they nevertheless prepare the way for a bringing-forth of the Good. This Good will 
gradually become apparent as the action progresses and Edna is released from her blocked 
state in order to follow the destiny that the film is preparing for her.60 
The film is asking its audience to accept that the deaths are not what they first seem (a 
misfortune blighting the family), but part of a divine providence ordering the world accord-
ing to the principles of justice in which everyone will eventually receive their fair share (ex-
emplified by the legislative righting of the wrong of categorising abandoned children in law 
as illegitimate “foundlings”). The deaths are thus sacrifices in the name of a providential or-
der fated in the melodrama itself. The audience’s belief in a just world is affirmed through 
faith in the machinery of melodrama — its ellipses, compressions and coincidences of plot — 
to deliver such a world in the amelioration of human existence from injustice to justice re-
vealed in the unfolding of the film. After further sacrifice by Edna (she gives up her adopted 
son to a worthy couple), the film ends on an elevated note with patriotic music playing over 
the end titles, leaving the audience in no doubt about who the guarantor of this just world 
really is. 
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The audience is called  into the “structure of feeling” of melodrama through an interpel-
lation whereby they recognise their own fate as that of the characters in the film. The elision 
of time and the coincidences of plot keep the audience focused on the release of the pro-
tagonist from the blockage of forces that prevent her from attaining her assigned goal. Her 
release is also the release of the audience, who no longer feel themselves trapped in a world 
ruled by chance and indifference, but freed for the coming of the Good. They bear witness 
to the fate of the protagonist, carrying its liberating truth with them. However, the melo-
dramatic structure also has its own form of blockage. By calling the audience into its struc-
ture, melodrama blocks the possibility that the events might lead otherwise. This is not an 
otherwise that is already known, but the “not” that makes this film possible in its very self-
affirmation. This “not” is what the film excludes in its faithful rendering of the American 
Way as a progression towards the Good. It is not another way that the film could have been 
made (for instance by thinking of different plot machinations to gain different outcomes), 
but the other of melodrama itself — a counter-melodrama that this film can never be. The 
revelations of melodrama always point to a “beyond” fully anticipated by the machinations 
of plot and narrative drive; a beyond already prepared for at every step of the way by the 
reversals of ill-fortune into good fortune, and through coincidences that circle the story back 
onto itself. But it also reveals another beyond — the “other beginning” in the excluded pos-
sibilities not shown.61 This beyond cannot be seen by seeing with the ameliorating move-
ment, but by seeing it otherwise, in the other beginning foreclosed by the film’s own closure 
in the moral Good. 
Audience belief in the cinematic world with its affirmation of the American Way is 
locked in place through faith in the machinery of melodrama to deliver the feeling of release 
and liberation required to sustain such belief as a quasi-religious sense of a divine provi-
dence rescuing human being from chance and the meaninglessness of life. To counter this 
locked-in “structure of feeling” and take the “other beginning” prepared by, but not offered 
by film melodrama, film would need to call its audience in a different way. Film would need 
to resist the appeal to a transcendent order delivered by the machinery of plot, thereby refus-
ing the solution to the ills and misfortunes of the world through a divinely ordered provi-
dence. What would such a film be required to do? It would need to render the fate of the 
audience unrecognisable in the events presented by the film, thereby defying the divine 
providence offered by film melodrama, and opening into the “otherness” of the film calling 
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against itself. To do this would be to invoke a “beyond” unbound from the structure of feel-
ing of the cinematic real — a beyond of a non-cinema real. In the rest of this paper I will look 
at Terrence Malick’s film The Tree of Life as offering its audience an experience of beyond cin-
ema, in the opening of the film frame against itself.
BEYOND CINEMA: THE TREE OF LIFE
Terrence Malick’s film The Tree of Life poses a series of questions to its audience through char-
acter voice-overs that concern the meaning of human life made meaningless by the indiffer-
ent force of nature that strikes individuals and families with calamities and death. Like Blos-
soms in the Dust, The Tree of Life presents human being as challenged to renew faith in some-
thing beyond when faced with calamitous events. These voice-overs speak in a language that 
is both spiritual and at times specifically Christian. It is tempting to read the film in the terms 
set by these voice-overs, as if they held the key to the ultimate meaning of the film. However, 
there is a danger in taking this approach, as it reduces the film to one of its elements, rather 
than in terms of the film as a whole. Voice-overs and their accompanying images are part of 
this whole, but they do not explain it. To reduce The Tree of Life to a film about religion based 
on its invocation of religious terms and images is to overlook the presentation of the film as 
such. It risks a reading that too readily affirms the symbolic language of the film at the ex-
pense of its self-presentation: its appearing as film, as distinct from what is said by the char-
acters about the world that appears in it. In The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, Walter 
Benjamin proposes a way of reading literary and cultural texts in terms of how they allego-
rize their symbolic content. Allegorical readings show how cultural texts always run up 
against their own limits in the failure to deliver the promised symbolic content.62 They in-
voke the destructive principle that is itself the very life of finite human existence as the 
deathly nothingness of possibility — of a beyond without measure. By reading The Tree of Life 
in terms of its allegorizing of symbolic content, I will show how the film both offers and 
withdraws its promise of transcendent meaning. In its very self-presentation, the film decon-
structs its symbolic “message,” opening to the beyond of the non-cinematic real.
As I have indicated at the beginning of this paper, a post-religious film is a film that em-
ploys religious content within a framework of belief in which human being is no longer 
grounded in a religious metaphysics. A religious film in a post-religious world accounts for 
religion not as the truth of this world, but as one of the ways in which human being is able to 
CINEMA 4 · MULES! 149
have a world. The Tree of Life presents a certain vision of human being as having a world 
through religious belief, but places this “having” within an evolutionary scheme in which 
the religious elements are themselves the result of an evolved way of being. Consequently, 
the religious content of the film can only provide partial answers to the question of being — 
what does it mean to have being? — that the film poses to its characters and to its audience. 
In posing this question of being in religious terms, the film is not necessarily affirming a 
Christian message, but enacting its own historical finitude in order to re-affirm the mystery 
of Being as the unattainable “beyond.”   
The film opens with a quote from the Book of Job: 38:4,7: “Where were you when I laid 
the foundations of the Earth?  When the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God 
shouted for joy.” The film thus begins with a question: a question concerning the where-
abouts of an unnamed “you” — someone missing from the primary event of the creation of 
the earth filled with divine grace. In the Book of Job this “you” is Job, who is challenged by 
God to retain faith despite the calamities visited upon him. But the “you” is also addressed 
to whomever hears it — the audience of the film. The voice interpellates audience members 
into the film, challenging them to account for their absence from God’s grace and their own 
fall into a meaningless world beset by calamities. As audience members, we are challenged 
to restore our faith in a world deprived of divine grace. 
Precisely what is it that Job is asked to do? This is what Slajov Žižek has to say about 
Job’s biblical task: “After Job is hit by calamities, his theological friends come, offering inter-
pretations which render these calamities meaningful. The greatness of Job is not so much to 
protest his innocence as to insist on the meaninglessness of his calamities.”63 Job’s task is not 
to see signs of a divine plan in the calamities that beset him, but to simply bear up to them, 
thereby affirming the absence of a divine order watching over him. The lesson of Job is that 
God resides not in a transcendent order but in the very being of things, in their possibilities 
as chance events. As Žižek goes on to say:
the legacy of Job prevents us from taking refuge in the standard transcendent figure of 
God as a secret Master who knows the meaning of what appears to us as meaningless 
catastrophe, the God who sees the entire picture in which what we perceive as a stain 
contributes to global harmony.64 
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The “greatness” of Job is to refuse doctrinal solutions to the evils of this world, while still re-
taining faith in God. Faith in God is faith in the “otherness” of this world not as a transcen-
dent order, but in the very possibility of a “beyond” through the strike of chance that brings 
bad fortune and calamitous death, and challenges our belief in this world as divinely or-
dered. In Simon Critchley’s terms, faith is faith in the nothing of this world, a nothing that 
makes otherness possible. This faith in the nothing as faith in the something beyond lies at 
the heart of Malick’s film The Tree of Life. 
Within a few minutes of the film’s beginning, we are presented with a death. A telegram 
is delivered to the front door of a neat suburban home in Waco, Texas. It is not long before 
we learn that the telegram contains terrible news — a family member has been killed. The 
woman who answers the door (Mrs. O’Brien, the mother of the dead son, played by Jessica 
Chastain) slowly reads the telegram, a look of despair gradually appearing on her face as the 
news sinks in. Suddenly she is shifted to one side through two successive jump cuts, accom-
panied by a twisting and foreshortening of the camera as she moves around the room in de-
spair. She then sinks to the floor with an anguished sob and just as quickly, rises again. This 
“genuflection” continues the unsettling sequence of movements already enacted in the scene, 
as if she were being thrown around by an invisible force.65 What are we to make of these ges-
tures? 
In their analysis of Jean-Luc Godard’s Hélas pour moi (Woe is Me, 1993), Bersani and 
Dutoit describe a moment in the film where “a non-transitional displacement occurs entirely 
within the framed scene.”66 In the scene in question, a female figure is thrown slightly to one 
side while retaining the same position:
she is twice thrown a few inches to the left where she has been sitting. [...] [S]he does not 
move from one position to another; rather, she simultaneously disappears and reoccurs 
to the side of herself. [...] [I]t might seem that some positional “mistake” were being cor-
rected by an agent unconstrained by the distance between points. Being is transferred 
without being moved.67 
In Godard’s film, the female figure is possessed by God, who comes to her in the form of her 
absent husband. In this visitation, the film “carries” Being — the measureless infinite of finite 
life — in the disjunctive jump of the female figure so that she appears both “here” and 
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“there” at the same time. This carrying of Being is effected through a violent deframing ges-
ture, exposing a crack within the framing of the film that opens “otherwise.” In The Tree of 
Life, a similar displacement occurs, as the female figure is taken out of herself while remain-
ing where she is within the film’s frame.68 Death comes to her as a crack in the structure of 
the film so that she seems to be possessed by a force that moves her around the room. But we 
also see something else. Although falling almost to her knees, the female figure immediately 
rises again as if she were willing herself to stand against the momentum of the force pulling 
her down. All this happens in the blink of an eye, but it is telling.
Just what she is resisting becomes apparent in the following scene, which shifts to her 
husband (Brad Pitt) speaking on the telephone at an airport terminal. As the husband hears 
the news of the death of his son over the telephone, he falls to the tarmac as if in prayer (he 
too appears to be hit by jump cuts, but this time accompanied by a doom-laden tolling bell). 
Later, we see him at prayer again, this time alone in the family home, with his wife looking 
on from an adjacent room. The respective falls of the husband and wife — both as if pos-
sessed by an invisible force — suggest different “ways of being” in relation to the death of 
the son. While the husband appears to have accepted the son’s death as part of a divine or-
der, the wife refuses and looks away. This glancing away, repeated elsewhere in the film, is a 
“looking otherwise”: a way of not being with the “will” that fates human being to a divine 
order in death.69 The wife is looking away from what she is already fated to be: subject to the 
“will to power” enacted in the nuclear family, obeying the patriarchal authority of the hus-
band and the obligation to God defined by a Protestant work ethic, all linked to the 
industrial-economic-nation nexus. In looking away, the mother is resisting her own “being” 
as part of the American Way. What is it that she seeks? 
What she seeks can be found in the way women are positioned in the film’s story world. 
The fragmentary narrative presents the life of a nuclear family in mid-twentieth century 
small town America, attempting to meet the demands placed on them by the industrialised 
capitalist system and its underlying ethos of work, progress, and success through male en-
trepreneurialism, embodied in the figure of the father. We see the father disciplining his sons 
into the “way of being” of competitive capitalism (a Bildung, which will be addressed 
shortly), requiring individual toughness and an ability to take knocks. However, this mascu-
line toughness fails to bring the hoped for success and the father loses his job and patent ap-
plications for his inventions are rejected.70 His eldest son Jack eventually becomes a success-
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ful architect, but has lost faith in the American Way. The film suggests that the evolution of 
human being through a masculine will to power has run its course, opening up the possibil-
ity of another beginning led by the feminine principle. This other beginning, blocked by the 
masculine will to power, now begins to open, as we see images of Jack being led through a 
mysterious gateway by a female muse that could be his wife or any one of a number of 
women whose faces we have glimpsed in the film.
It could be argued that the film is the presentation of Jack’s childhood memories in 
flashback. However, this would be to give too much authority to Jack’s version of events and 
to privilege the ontological status of Jack at the expense of the film as a whole. Rather, Jack’s 
“flashbacks” are better understood as moments in the film, mixed in with other moments, all 
of which are orchestrated into an experience of disjunctive-chiasmic time (time that crosses 
over itself so that the past is experienced as the future and vice versa).71 The film presents the 
life of the O’Brien family as a series of vignettes, as if the audience were looking at a family 
snapshot album in which the photographs mysteriously come to life. In this way, the audi-
ence bears witness to the life of the O’Brien family in fragmented image-events that carry 
their truth in the disjunctive opening between life and death in the manner described by Bar-
thes in Camera Lucida (discussed earlier in the paper). Each image-event bears witness to the 
“life-death”72 of the O’Brien family: its “having to believe” in order to go on living in the 
event of the calamitous death of the son. The events presented cease to be about the life of a 
particular family, and become universalised as the very possibility of life faced with mortal-
ity. 
In this universalised “life-death,” women are positioned to go along with but resist the 
will to power required of them in the nuclear family as an evolved way of being based on the 
masculine principle operating in mid-twentieth century America. The evolution of this way 
of being is signalled in the film through a lengthy “beginning of time” sequence, a third of 
the way into the film, featuring a dinosaur scene where we see one dinosaur spare the life of 
another as the first evidence of the will to power in nature. The dinosaurs in this scene are 
presented as neither male nor female, indicating that the will to power comes to evolving life 
without a specific gender. This will have consequences for how we read the gendering of 
power relations later in the film where the will to power becomes associated with the mascu-
line principle. Male authority in the modern nuclear family derives, so the film suggests, 
from an evolved way of being that is not essential to the will to power as such, but to other 
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factors, such as the ideological practices of self-formation (e.g., when we see the father train-
ing his sons in the skills of manhood) that reproduce this way of being as part of the indus-
trialised capitalist-state-religious nexus. The will to power is not essentially masculine but 
takes a masculine form at a certain evolved stage of human being. It can always be otherwise 
from any finite moment of historically evolved way of being.
The sparing of life by the dinosaur suggests self-consciousness and a capacity to control 
power over others. It places the “fall” into freedom as the awareness of possibility in life well 
before humans. Human being is thus placed in evolutionary time after the coming of free-
dom. The film thus suspends the traditional mythical explanations of human existence in 
terms of a divinely decreed world entrusted to humans as superior free beings. What we see 
happening in mid-twentieth century America is the acting out of an already evolving will to 
power, including rationalisations of life through religion, science and industrialised technol-
ogy. These higher rationalisations contribute to and explain the evolved way of being em-
bodied by the O’Brien family and their neighbours but they do not comprehend it.
The dinosaur scene is repeated later in the film when the eldest son (Jack) comes across 
his father working under the family’s jacked-up car. Having previously been admonished by 
his father for disobedience and consequently suffering overwhelming resentment, the boy is 
tempted to release the jack. However, he refuses the temptation73  and, as a consequence, 
suddenly grows up; he no longer reacts to the world by lashing out in frustration, anger and 
resentment, and begins to see his life in a more independent way, taking the first steps to-
wards assuming responsibility for others. Like the dinosaur who discovers the will to power 
as the freedom to either kill or spare the life of the other, Jack discovers the will to power as 
freedom to “be otherwise.”74 This freedom however implies a moral responsibility to others 
and an awareness of the contradictory nature of human existence: he realises that he is now 
burdened with a sense of freedom where, in his own words “whatever I want to do I can’t 
do; I do what I hate.” In an ensuing scene, we see Jack testing one of his younger brothers in 
a game of trust, where he commands the brother to place his finger over a loaded air gun. As 
the brother goes to place his finger over the end of the barrel, the gun suddenly goes off and 
he runs away in fright. Later, Jack seeks out his brother and asks for his forgiveness, some-
thing he could not have done previously. Jack’s coming-of-age through resisting the tempta-
tion to kill his father not only gives him power over others, but also fills him with a sense of 
guilt and responsibility. In a decisive way, he now becomes a moralised human being.75 
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These tests and trials of trust are part of a Bildung: the development of the self from a natural 
way of being towards consciousness of the universal order, shown here as the way in which 
male children learn how to become moral human beings, aware of their responsibilities to 
others.76 In this case the Bildung is shown in terms of the coming of the will to power as an 
evolved state of being, initially through the dinosaur scene and then repeated in the coming 
of age of the O’Brien children. The film is saying that human morality is part of the broader 
evolution of life. 
The Bildung presented in The Tree of Life takes up a significant amount of the film and in-
volves tests and trials between the boys as well as training by their father in “how to be a 
man.” The Bildung is focalised through Jack, and involves challenging his father’s authority 
as well as asserting his authority over his younger brother in the formation of the masculine 
self as part of the will to power of mid-twentieth century American industrialised capitalism. 
This power is disciplinary power, as distinct from the control power of the post-
industrialised societies of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.77 Jack has to 
learn obedience to the father not only by obeying his commands but also by feeling the fa-
ther’s power through the grip his father has on his body (there are numerous images of the 
father gripping and holding the boys’ bodies as he playfully teaches them how to “be a 
man”). He also has to learn how to become a father himself, first by breaking away from the 
father’s controlling grip, and then by letting go of his childish love of his mother and by dis-
placing his burgeoning sexual desire onto other mother-like female figures. In one scene he 
sneaks into the house of a female neighbour and steals her sheer nightgown after first laying 
it out on her bed. He then runs out of the house and into the woods where he hides the 
nightgown in a hole under a plank of discarded timber. Thinking better of it, he takes the 
nightgown out of the hole and throws it into the nearby river where he watches it float away. 
Here we see the enactment of displaced sexual desire: unable to seduce the woman as a man 
might do, the boy does the next best thing — he turns the garment that covers the woman’s 
nakedness into a sexual fetish. By first burying and then disinterring the nightgown, he re-
leases his sexual desire into the flow of the river (the river of life), preparing himself for the 
life to come as a fully sexualised man. 
These trials of strength and rituals of desire prepare Jack for his life as an adult male. 
Significantly, the moment when Jack challenges his father’s authority and begins to take on 
the moral responsibilities of an adult male, his father’s own authority begins to wane and he 
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starts to treat Jack as a man. It is also at this point that the father recognises his own failure in 
life, and where he realises something else as well: he has failed to see the glory. In a moment 
of regret, the father confesses: “I dishonoured it all, and didn’t notice the glory.” In now rec-
ognising that he has failed to see the glory, he is making a tacit comment on the masculinised 
way of being required of him and his sons in having to live up to the demands of a discipline 
society in mid-twentieth century American capitalism. These demands requires a Bildung  in 
which sons become fathers (i.e., bearers of self-affirming patriarchal authority) through 
learning the strategies of survival and success within competitive capitalism. This Bildung  is 
also linked to the church and to the state which justify disciplinary authority of fathers over 
their wives and sons by teaching obedience and trust. 
Although taking up almost half the film, the masculinised Bildung  is presented as a fail-
ure: in adult life, Jack has rejected the capitalist will to power that affirms the masculine, and 
has turned to the feminine as a means of escape. Throughout the film the feminine is seen 
but has no voice. In further examples of the masculine will to power, the father exercises a 
brutal control over his family when one of the sons dares to challenge his authority at the 
breakfast table. Exploding with rage, he reaches over the table, gripping the offending son 
and marching him out of the room while the wife looks on in alarm, afraid to speak out. 
Later, he accuses his wife of turning his sons against him, and she fights back by striking him 
on the chest with her clenched fists. He then grips her in a smothering hold as one might 
subdue a frightened animal. This “taming” of the wife restores his authority and the mascu-
line will to power that defines the way of being of the O’Brien household. But it also acts 
emblematically for the universal restoration of authority of the masculinised way of being 
throughout America at that time. By showing how the masculinised will to power blocks the 
feminine, the film sets up the possibility of an unblocking as well. Throughout the film, we 
see this possibility in repeated images of the force of nature opening into a glorious beyond. 
These images are associated with the feminine as the unblocking of the blocked spirit into a 
rigid masculinised way of being that leads to a dead end. 
The questions posed by the characters in voice-over throughout the film in terms of 
Christian notions of grace and nature are attempts to give voice to the “question of being,” as 
each character rises in his or her own way to the challenge set by God (the indifferent force of 
nature and the event of chance) in visiting calamities on the family that plunge them into ni-
hilistic despair. But these responses can only provide partial answers. This is because they, 
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like human being itself, are subject to evolved time. Evolved time is time that reproduces a 
specific way of being, but in doing so, blocks other ways of being from coming about. Thus, 
the masculinised, patriarchal way of being presented in the O’Brien family as part of evolved 
nature, blocks other ways of being in its very presentation. The female way of being — the 
way of grace — is presented as the way of being that the film allows us to see, but in its 
blocked state. It is the “not” of the film; the “other beginning” revealed in the film’s turning 
against itself. This is why we see the mother glance away from her kneeling husband on 
hearing of the death of their son: she is looking otherwise, resisting the evolved and hence 
naturalised  way of being that demands obedience to the law of the father; a way of being that 
she must nevertheless accept as part of who she is.
The flaw or defect of the film is the fall of human being into otherness — in the ontologi-
cal gap in time where the possibility of a reconciliation between the past and the present is 
both affirmed and denied. As we saw with Barthes’s punctum effect, the presence of an irre-
trievable life or event is felt in its loss when viewing photographs against the grain of their 
generic meaning. This sense of loss is not a melancholic pining, but a “bearing witness” that 
carries the loss with it as a “truth of life” — an enactment of faith in life that must go on. This 
enactment of faith comes through the interference of the chance event that “rises out of the 
scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me.”78 This piercing of my being when con-
fronted by the chance event of death portrayed in the photograph, shatters my belief in the 
meaning of the event — its generic denotation as part of a system of belief in the capacity of 
technology to reproduce life as factually real — and turns me otherwise into a truth that has to 
be believed: the truth of the inescapable contingency of mortal life and the demand that life 
must go on. In terms of the “death event” in The Tree of Life, this shattering of belief comes 
through the death of the son which hits the family like a thunderbolt, shaking them to their 
foundations. On receiving the news of the son’s death, the mother and father literally fall to 
their knees, while the frame of the film splits apart, plunging the scene into a spiralling mo-
tion as it follows the mother around the room and tracks the husband as he seeks solace in 
prayer. 
This splitting and twisting of the film’s frame triggers a collapse in the temporal order-
ing of events. The scene ends with a shot of the telegram delivery man leaving the house, but 
instead of appearing hatless and in the zip-up bomber jacket we saw him wearing at the start 
of the scene, he is now wearing a full blue uniform and peaked cap. It is as if we have been 
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taken back in time while staying in the present. This crossing of time is continued through 
the rest of the film. For instance, we learn later in the film that the death of the son occurs in 
his late teens, yet there is nothing in the scene to suggest this. Rather, we are encouraged to 
think that the son has died in the childhood just presented in the previous scene. The blend-
ing of time frames is compounded when, a few scenes further on, we see a boy drowned in 
the local swimming pool. The body of the dead boy, who looks much the same age as the 
O’Brien boy, is pulled out of the water and offered to Mr. O’Brien kneeling at the side of the 
pool as if it were his own son. This confused blending of time and doubling of characters and 
events produces a chiasm in the structure of the film, where current events appear to be af-
fecting events that have already happened. The death event visited upon the O’Brien family 
is not contained within their own lives but reverberates through the community and 
throughout the entire film, affecting everyone and everything with a mortal sense of life and 
the proximity of death in all things. Narrative drive is thwarted and characters are drawn 
away from their fate in a higher moral order predicated on the American Way, causing them 
to question their existence and belief in God.
In Blossoms in the Dust the deaths of Charlotte and Sammy are sacrifices, enabling Edna 
to move along her destined path to ameliorate the condition of illegitimate children. Their 
lives thus have meaning. The ellipses of time and coincidences of plot harness the random-
ness of thrown life — life subject to chance in a world from which God has withdrawn – by 
smoothing it into a purposeful event. Their lives are given meaning in terms of the apparatus 
of melodrama in which a divine providence is seen to be working through the presented 
events leading to the affirmation of a higher moral order. However, in The Tree of Life, no such 
solution can be found. The death of the son is not a sacrifice, but an enigmatic event that 
poses unanswerable questions. The film does not elide the death in order to suture itself into 
a higher order in the manner of melodrama, but tarries in its reverberating effects — in the 
fragments of its collapsing narrative framework. In this breaching of the film frame a possi-
bility appears in the shining of nature. The lesson of the film is the same as the one that Job 
has to learn: that God’s presence is not to be found in a transcendent moral order that ex-
plains the occurrence of chance events and the ills of the world, but in accepting such events 
as part of life itself in its opening into the void of otherness, as this life and no other. Thus the 
“answer” to God’s question with which the film began is not to be found in pondering on the 
meaning of religious doctrine or in seeking solace in prayer, but in a joyous sense of being-
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open to the “beyond” offered by the film itself in its images of nature shining through all 
things. This beyond cannot be seen through the will to power of the masculinised way of 
evolved human being, predicated as it is on discipline and patriarchy. Rather, it can only be 
seen through the way of grace carried by the feminine principle, as the other way that the 
film presents but in a blocked state.
CONCLUSION
Schleiermacher defines religious experience as an “activity” felt in the stasis of human being 
blocked from being otherwise. This activity is an “immediate experience”79 felt by resisting 
systems (“[s]eeing I have rejected systems, commentaries and apologies”)80 that smooth 
away the effects of calamities and chance events through pious feelings and elevated 
thoughts.81 Religious experience does not seek solace in doctrine or a transcendent God, but 
calls for a release from the blockage of being into divine life as an immediate experience of 
the finite in the infinite. The possibility of divine life is always right there where we already 
are, but experienced otherwise, in the release from blocked being.
My claim in this paper is that Terrence Malick’s film The Tree of Life enacts this releasing 
of blocked being into a “beyond” equivalent to Schleiermacher’s religious experience as a 
release into the infinite-divine. The release of blocked being in The Tree of Life is triggered by 
a breaching of the cinematic framing of the events presented in the film such that they turn 
against the frame itself, collapsing temporality and opening the film otherwise. This turning 
of the film against itself counters the normalisation of belief in the cinematic experience of 
melodrama, where chance events are smoothed into an ameliorative movement, serving the 
purpose of a divine providence that reaches towards the moral Good. The collapsed fram-
ing of The Tree of Life breaches the cinematic real — the expectation delivered by the appara-
tus of melodrama that things will turn out all right, that defeats are really a prelude to vic-
tory and that death is the necessary sacrifice for the living — and opens into a non-
cinematic beyond, challenging the audience’s belief in the capacity of the cinematic appara-
tus to fulfil the promise of divine providence. The film enables its audience to bear witness 
to this beyond, restoring the audience’s faith in the film to carry the event of Being with it. 
The film is itself an event of being-with the beyond of the cinematic real itself. 
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